Proposals to introduce a Tribunal for Assisted Suicide in the UK by Carr, Claudia
Proposals to introduce a Tribunal for Assisted Suicide in the UK 
Claudia Carr 
 
It is time that Parliament took the brave and audacious move to publically debate 
legalising assisted suicide in the UK. Even though a Private Members Bill has 
recently been introduced in Parliament, it has little hope of success without 
Government backing.  The continual underlying objection of the fear of the 
slippery slope and the effect of legalising assisted suicide would have on the 
elderly and the vulnerable is a justifiable one; however, the patient’s autonomy 
must be respected and it will be argued it is possible to legislate in favour of 
assisted suicide whilst protecting the vulnerable. It will be argued that the 
introduction of a Tribunal style system to speedily and sympathetically consider 
each and every patient’s plea to end their lives should be introduced. This would 
enable a panel, comprising representatives from both the judiciary and the medical 
profession an opportunity to assess each case on its merits. It would seek to 
confirm whether the patient has a terminal condition from which they will die 
within 9-12 months and each patient will be given a cooling off period to explore 
options of palliative care. Each case will be recorded and each death reported. The 
Panel will ensure that the patient is not being unduly pressurised and the person 
who will assist has nothing to gain. Each case will be closely monitored and each 
patient treated as an individual. Society should temper paternalism with respect for 
a patient’s autonomy in order to end the imbalance between the right of a patient to 
refuse medical treatment where they will surely die as a result and the lack of 
respect for the self determination of a patient who is clear they wish to end their 
life.  
***** 
2.     Introduction 
The issue of assisted dying has been the subject of high profile cases since 
2002 and the ethical and legal debates have remained in the forefront of the 
media’s spotlight. There have been a number of Parliamentary Bills introduced by 
Lord Joffe to legalise assisted dying and most recently a Private Members Bill was 
introduced by the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Falconer. Moreover, assisted 
dying has the vocal support of the high profile author, Terry Pratchett, himself an 
Alzheimer’s sufferer and Stephen Hawking, the world famous theoretical physicist 
and cosmologist who suffers from motor neurone disease.  
              This paper will examine the approach taken by the courts in cases where 
the applicant has sought a declaration to end their life by way of assisted dying and 
examine the justification of their decisions. The paper will then embark on a 
proposal which could respect a person’s self determination to decide for 
themselves the stage at which they wish to end their life whilst seeking to ensure 
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the protection of the vulnerable. This proposal does not purport to be able to 
address every hurdle in its proposals to legalise assisted suicide but it hopes to take 
a more robust and adventurous approach to reach an end which permits those who 
suffer from a terminal condition to die with dignity. 
2. The Law 
In 1961, the Suicide Act decriminalised the offence of suicide, although to 
date assisting or encouraging a suicide remains a criminal offence in the UK 
which, upon conviction can impose a maximum sentence of 14 years 
imprisonment. In 2009, section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act amended 
section 2(1) of the Suicide Act by inserting a new section 2A which states that a 
person commits an offence if the defendant ‘does an act capable of encouraging or 
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person’.  
               For many years, the courts have recognised the fundamental principle of 
patient autonomy. In the 1972 case of S v McC: W v W1 Lord Reid said, ‘… 
English law goes to great lengths to protect a person of full age and capacity from 
interference with his personal liberty.’ The view was reaffirmed in re T (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment)2, where Lord Donaldson said ‘…. . the patient’s right of 
choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, irrational, 
unknown or even non-existent’. These cases demonstrate that the wishes of a 
competent patient to refuse medical treatment even where it will lead to the 
patient’s death must be respected and a patient’s autonomy clearly outweighs the 
principle of sanctity of life. Perhaps one of the best known cases is Ms B v An 
NHS Hospital Trust3. Ms B was entirely dependent on a ventilator to breathe and 
was paralysed from the neck down. She sought a declaration from the courts that 
artificial ventilation be withdrawn and any continuing ventilation would be an 
unlawful trespass. There was no question of a lack of competency and the court 
upheld her wishes, permitting her to die in the manner she wanted and at a time of 
her choosing. In the same year, the courts were hearing the case of Diane Pretty, 
who suffering from motor neurone disease, wanted to die at a time of her choosing. 
Most importantly, she sought an assurance from the DPP that her husband would 
not be prosecuted if her were to help her to die. The House of Lords and later the 
ECHR were at pains to point out that Article 2 of the ECHR was not incompatible 
with Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 and could not  
‘be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, 
namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination 
in the sense of conferring on the entitlement to choose death rather 




Moreover, as far as having the right to end her life at a time of her 
choosing and whether this fell into the scope of Article 8, the court held that it was 
justifiable and not a disproportionate measure under Article 8(2)4 to impose a 
blanket ban. The contrast between the case of Pretty and Ms B is subtle but 
relevant as the courts recognised Ms B’s right, as a competent patient to refuse 
medical treatment even where it would lead to her death. She was choosing death 
over life. In Pretty, the courts went to lengths to reject personal autonomy where 
the scope was suddenly extended to involve another person or the possible effects 
on other sections of society. The rejection of the Article 8 argument was based 
upon the courts desire to balance competing interests. However, a balance could 
not be achieved between a person’s right to self-determination to be able to die at 
the time they wished and the protection of both the vulnerable and the disabled 
who could be influenced or pressurised to end their life for fear of being a burden 
on others. Whilst it is indisputably right to protect the vulnerable, it is oppressive to 
force those who wish to die, to remain living in pain and suffering. 
                The case of Purdy v DPP5 brought the issue of assisted dying once more 
to the attention of the media and public debate. Ms Purdy successfully challenged 
the DPP’s failure to establish a specific policy setting out the circumstances in 
which a person would be prosecuted for encouraging or assisting another’s suicide 
contrary to Section 2A Suicide Act 1961 as amended.  Following Purdy, the DPP 
set out guidelines purporting to be a ‘clear framework’ including 16 public interest 
factors in favour of prosecution and 6 public interests factors against prosecution. 
The guidelines are however about the motive of the person suspected of 
encouraging or assisting suicide not about the patient or ‘victim’ themselves. The 
most recent high profile case is R (on the application of Nicklinson) v MOJ and 
others; R (on the application of AM) v DPP and others6 where the two applicants 
suffering from ‘locked in syndrome’ wished to be able to end their lives at a time 
of their choosing.  It was acknowledged by Lord Justice Toulson that they ‘present 
society with legal and ethical questions of the most difficult kind7’ but the 
applicants unsuccessfully argued that the common law defence of necessity to a 
charge of murder should be available in cases of assisted dying and argued that the 
Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible with Article 8.  
In practical terms, the cases referred to above are asking the courts to recognise 
their rights under Article 8 so they can determine for themselves the time at which 
they wish to die. The courts are sympathetic and whilst the judiciary can and do 
change law, they refuse to do so in an area which ‘raises profoundly sensitive 
questions about the nature of our society, and its value and standards on which 
passionate but contradictory opinions are held8’. 
                   The blanket ban on assisted dying and the courts reliance on Article 
8(2) are entirely correct; assisted dying is a matter for Parliament to debate and 
legislate on, if appropriate and not for the courts to judicially determine by 
extending the margin of appreciation.   
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‘…the law relating to assisted suicide cannot be changed by 
judicial decision. The repeated mantra that, if the law is to be 
changed, it must be changed by Parliament, does not 
demonstrate judicial abnegation of our responsibilities, but rather 
highlights fundamental constitutional principles’9. 
3. Autonomy 
Throughout a person’s life, one has free will and autonomy to decide how 
to live their life. The law however, refuses to allow a person who has been 
diagnosed from a terminal and incurable disease to end their life at the time of their 
choosing. It lacks logical application to be refused the right to die at a time when 
that person feels their life lacks a quality they would wish to enjoy and when they 
feel that all dignity has been removed from their life. The irony is that if a patient 
with an incurable and terminal disease required lifesaving hospital treatment, even 
for an unrelated condition, they could refuse treatment and seek certain death. 
Moreover, the only avenue open to a person who wishes to end their life is to travel 
to Dignitas in Switzerland which will assist a person to end their life. It is 
oppressive that a person should have to embark on this journey when they should 
be ending their life in the place of their choice, more than likely their own home, 
surrounded by their family and friends. Furthermore, although there has never been 
a prosecution of those returning from accompanying their loved one to Dignitas to 
die, concern has led the person wishing to die to travel at an earlier time than they 
otherwise would and when they are still are to travel independently.  
4. A call to legislate 
Thus, it is for Parliament to legislate to enable those who wish to do so, 
have a dignified death and at the same time protect the vulnerable. The Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013, introduced by Lord Falconer as a Private Member’s Bill10 comes 
as a direct result of the Report from the Commission on Assisted Dying which 
Lord Falconer chaired. The Commission set up in November 2010 examined both 
the legal and ethical policy position of assisted dying in the UK, concluding that it 
was both ‘inadequate and incoherent’. It recommended legalisation in favour of 
assisted suicide through a structured framework of criteria and safeguards. 
                It comes therefore as a surprise to see that the latest Bill on assisted 
dying contains few of the recommended safeguards and criteria but in fact, differs 
little from the four previous Bills that have failed to progress effectively through 
Parliament in the past 10 years.  The Bill recommends that a person can receive 
assistance in dying if that person has capacity, has made a clear and informed 
intention to end their life and is suffering from an ‘inevitably progressive condition 





               The Bill fails to address the one aspect fundamental stumbling block; the 
protection of the vulnerable. If the law is to permit the vociferous minority who are 
self-motivated and determined to end their life then the Bill has to address the 
vulnerability of those who might also be affected and if it fails to do so, it is 
doomed to failure.  
It is for this reason that any proposed legislation should establish an 
Assisted Dying Tribunal.  The aims of proposed legislation would be largely 
similar to the existing Bill, that is, to permit a competent patient suffering from a 
terminal illness from which they will die within 6 months, the right to die with 
assistance either from the medical professional or from family. A tightly regulated 
Code of Practice would be introduced with stringent reporting requirements. 
               The purpose of any Tribunal would be to examine each and every request 
for assisted suicide on its merits. It is envisaged that a Tribunal would compose of 
a panel of 5 members (rather than the normal 3 members), including two lawyers, 
two doctors (one psychiatrist and one a specialist in the terminal condition from 
which the applicant suffers) and a lay person.                 
Membership should be carefully considered and be by appointment. No 
members of the Panel should have any affiliation either directly or indirectly with 
any organisation that either promote or condemns assisted suicide. The purpose of 
the Tribunal would be to examine with dignity and respect the person’s wish to end 
their life in a transparent, sensitive and open environment.  
                The applicant to the Tribunal should not be burdened by undue 
bureaucracy as evident in the court process and a hearing should take place 
expeditiously. Legal funding should be available. Any application to the Tribunal 
should entail two hearings, the first where the evidence is heard and a 
recommendation is made and then a second hearing after a ‘cooling off’ period, 
which would allow the applicant time to reflect and consider palliative care 
options. 
                The role of the lawyer and the psychiatrist would be to examine that the 
patient has capacity and has repeatedly expressed a settled wish to end their life. 
Evidence would be submitted directly by the applicant if possible in person or via 
video link.   
               The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is well equipped to serve this purpose and 
the principle contained in section 1 (4) that ‘a person is not to be treated as unable 
to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’ is pertinent as the 
Tribunal must subjectively rather than objectively consider the evidence before 
them.  Mental capacity is a fundamental consideration in the same way that the 
courts consider capacity when a patient refuses medical treatment understanding 
that it will lead to their death. An applicant will lack capacity if  
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‘at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself 
in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a 
disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’11. 
 For the purposes of section 3(1) a person lacks capacity if they are unable  
‘to understand the information relevant to the decision, to retain 
that information, and to use or weigh that information as part of 
the process of making the decision, or to communicate his 
decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means). 
 If they satisfy the requirement in the Mental Capacity Act, their capacity 
to make an informed decision will be satisfied.  
                Family and friends should be permitted to give evidence but this should 
be treated with caution as this could be the evidence of influence or undue pressure 
in the vulnerable. Nonetheless, for this very reason, it is also evidence that is 
important to hear.  
                Oral evidence combined with psychiatric evidence would also allow the 
Tribunal to examine whether the patient is suffering from a depressive condition 
which, if identified, may be an indication that their judgment may be affected and a 
signal that assisted suicide should not be an approved path. This examination of the 
patient’s mental capacity would address critics of the current Bill who express 
concern that there are no built in safeguards apart from the simple eligibility 
criteria. This proposal establishes not only that the patient has capacity (often not 
in doubt) but also goes to the crux of the objection – the protection of the 
vulnerable and disabled. It should be able to establish whether the applicant has 
been influenced or is subject to undue pressure as the inquisitorial nature of the 
Tribunal together with its expertise would have an opportunity to thoroughly 
investigate this avenue. The current Bill before parliament refers to terminal illness 
where the patient is ‘reasonably expected to die within six months’. Whilst a 
patient may be advised that they have a limited lifespan, the Royal College of 
Practitioners observed12  that  
‘it is possible to make reasonably accurate prognoses of death 
within minutes, hours or even a few days. When this stretches to 
months, then the scope for error can extend into years.’  
A clinical ‘guesstimate’ of life expectancy, however well intended may be 
inaccurate and the effect of the patient may be devastatingly relevant.  If a patient 
is told they have 18 months to live, they may have an entirely different perspective 




problem raises a difficult issue to address. It is for this reason that it is proposed 
that one of the Panel members would be an expert in the condition from which the 
applicant is suffering in order to provide a further opinion on prognosis. This paper 
does not propose a fail-safe solution to this perhaps insurmountable issue but it is 
an area which would benefit from further medical expertise. 
               The current Bill before Parliament is likely to fail. Although unlikely, 
Parliament needs to engage in an extensive debate on assisted dying. Establishing a 
Tribunal may well be the only avenue in which can serve the autonomous wishes 
of the determined terminal patient whilst protecting the vulnerable of society.  
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